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Introduction
In 1978, the Supreme Court chose Allied Structural Steel v. Span-
naus, 1 a Contract Clause2 case, to suggest a fundamental departure from
its post-Depression approach to economic regulation. Five years later,
in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,4 the Court
employed another Contract Clause case to exhibit second thoughts.' Al-
lied Structural Steel, the earlier case, was frighteningly "reminiscent of
the Lochner era."6 According to dissenting Justice Brennan, the major-
ity "undermine[d]" forty years of Contract Clause jurisprudence.7 Allied
1. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall. .. pass any. . .Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts ....").
3. Contract Clause cases form appropriate occasions for judicial reconsideration of the
constitutional structure of economic regulation. While the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause has overshadowed the Contract Clause in postwar jurisprudence of economic regu-
lation, the Contract Clause historically has formed the constitutional basis by which that
balance has been struck. The Contract Clause has been called the "major restraint on state
economic regulation" in the first century of government under the Constitution. G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (10th ed. 1980). Although by
its terms the clause restrains only state regulation, in the wake of the heightened scrutiny of
retroactive economic legislation required by Allied Structural Steel, several circuit courts con-
sidered whether to apply its revived Contract Clause principles to the federal government
through the Fifth Amendment. See A-T-O, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 634 F.2d
1013 (6th Cir. 1980); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
632 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1980); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d
947 (7th Cir. 1979), aft'd on statutory grounds, 446 U.S. 359 (1980); see also City of New
Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 686 F.2d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1201 (1983) (analyzing federal acts as if Contract Clause governs); cf. United States Trust v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 60 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Due Process Clause jurisprudence
could incorporate Contract Clause principles); Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir.
1948) (due process examination of federal impairment of contract, citing Depression-era Con-
tract Clause case). But cf. Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1264-65 (7th
Cir. 1983) (heightened Contract Clause scrutiny inapplicable to Fifth Amendment due process
case absent federal self-dealing) (dictum). See also infra note 5.
4. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
5. Following Energy Reserves, the Supreme Court suggested that the relaxed scrutiny of
state legislation under the Contract Clause undertaken in that decision would not form a sig-
nificant hurdle if applied to Congress through the Fifth Amendment. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984) (holding retroactive federal economic legis-
lation constitutional, refusing to apply heightened judicial scrutiny regardless of the Contract
Clause standard).
6. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44 (Supp. 1979).
7. 438 U.S. at 259-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (linking revived Contract Clause with
substantive constitutional review of economic legislation); see also United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Structural Steel arguably promised to renew Lochner era' constitutional
supervision of economic legislation by beginning a "process of reinvigo-
rating" the Contract Clause.9 This would overthrow the uncritical ap-
proach to economic regulation characteristic of constitutional
interpretation since the 1930's.1"
The Supreme Court abruptly reversed direction five years later in
Energy Reserves. Energy Reserves accepted legislative interference with a
private bargain for explicit redistributive purposes. Where Allied Struc-
tural Steel required that state legislation address "an important general
social problem"1 before allowing interference with contractual expecta-
tions, Energy Reserves provided a less precise and more relaxed standard
of Contract Clause scrutiny. It merely required that the legislation have
a "significant and legitimate public purpose." 2  Part I of this Article
explores these contrasts in detail.
This Article analyzes the differences between the Allied Structural
Steel and Energy Reserves decisions in terms of alternative judicial vi-
sions of economic regulation. Allied Structural Steel embodied a view of
economic life that recalls the Lochner era by protecting private rights
more than public needs and by assuming that markets successfully allo-
cate goods. In contrast, Energy Reserves returned to the deeply en-
trenched postwar view of economic regulation by acknowledging that
markets unsuccessfully handle important public problems. These cases
renew the judicial controversy between alternative views of economic
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidated a state law setting maximum
hours for bakery workers. Its progeny represent a period of strict judicial scrutiny of economic
regulation under the Due Process Clauses. During the Lochner era of constitutional interpre-
tation, progressive and redistributive social and economic legislation was invalidated under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in order to immunize contrac-
tual bargains from collateral government attack. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 435 (1978).
9. G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 567; see also Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The
Renaissance of the Contract Clause, 1979 Sup. Cr. REV. 95, 96; cf B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 237-38 (1980) (Allied Structural Steel accomplishes little
of the judicial policy change necessary to protect economic liberties). The potential breadth of
a reinvigorated Contract Clause is suggested by the wide range of contracts affected by state
action and tested under the Contract Clause since 1982. See, ag., Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at
400 (natural gas supply contract); Don't Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 696 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (municipal
bond); Utah League of Insured Sav. Assn's v. Utah, 555 F. Supp. 664, (D. Utah 1983) (due on
sale clause in mortgage); Scancio Motors, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 555 F. Supp.
1121 (D.R.I. 1982) (dealership agreement).
10. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 540 (describing "hands off" approach to
economic regulation).
11. 438 U.S. at 247.
12. 459 U.S. at 411.
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regulation. Parts II and III examine this dispute, which has permeated
Contract Clause decisions throughout the history of constitutional
interpretation.
These two Contract Clause cases also differ in their formulation of
constitutional doctrine. The Allied Structural Steel Court assumed its
doctrinal test was intuitive and obvious," while the Energy Reserves
Court admitted that application of constitutional doctrine may appear
arbitrary at times.14 Part IV explores how these opinions shift rhetorical
strategy when they reflect different judicial visions of economic life.
Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves depict a Supreme Court
poised between two different visions of the state's role in regulating eco-
nomic development. Judicial thought has reached an important histori-
cal crossroads. Every era of constitutional interpretation strikes its own
balance between ensuring public ability to solve economic and social
problems and, alternatively, preserving market incentives and personal
choice by protecting private bargains against state impairment. These
two recent Contract Clause decisions suggest that the Court is rethinking
this fundamental balance for our era.
The constitutional structure of economic regulation can evolve in
two ways from the present juncture. If Allied Structural Steel is an aber-
ration, then the Constitution will continue to permit the government to
take action in the public interest. On the other hand, if the contrasting
Energy Reserves decision is limited to public utility regulation where re-
distributive arguments are strongest, 15 the Allied Structural Steel empha-
sis on protection of private bargains will become an important
constitutional principle in limiting state power over economic affairs.
In sum, the Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves opinions are
notable for three reasons. First, these decisions determine the standard
of review for state economic regulation under the Contract Clause. Sec-
ond, they illustrate the connection between judicial beliefs about markets
and judicial use of language. Finally, these opinions denonstrate that a
critical juncture between different judicial visions of economic life lies
before the Supreme Court. The Court's choice between them, symbol-
13. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
15. Natural monopoly is the most common justification for public utility regulation. S.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982). While natural gas suppliers, like the
original plaintiff in Energy Reserves, are probably not natural monopolists, the defendant util-
ity may well be. Redistribution in Energy Reserves was based on a legislative preference for
consumers over producers in allocating a windfall between them. The same preference is ap-
plied when natural monopolists are subject to rate of return regulation. See, eg., S. BREYER,
supra, at 19-20.
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ized by the competing principles of Allied Structural Steel and Energy
Reserves, will shape the nature of constitutional supervision of economic
legislation.
I. Contrasting Rhetorical Strategies and Judicial Visions in
Recent Contract Clause Cases
The Energy Reserves and Allied Structural Steel opinions differ in
their attitude toward redistributive state legislation. The Allied Structural
Steel Court invalidated a Minnesota law that aided those long-time em-
ployees of firms that closed their Minnesota plants before their pension
plans had vested. The Court objected to the statute because it required
employers to provide pension funds for those long-term employees not
covered by a private plan even though the firms had never bargained for
that liability. The Court held that redistributive legislation that infringes
on private contracts violates the Constitution.1
6
In contrast, the Energy Reserves Court permitted the state of Kansas
to impose a price ceiling on intrastate natural gas sold to a public utility
following federal gas deregulation. This law restricted the windfall prof-
its of the gas producer and benefited consumers by lowering electricity
production costs and, consequently, electricity prices. The Energy
Reserves Court explicitly endorsed legislative redistribution. 7
Both opinions applied the Contract Clause analysis announced in
the leading twentieth century Contract Clause decision, Home Building
Association v. Blaisdell.18 Under that test, the private right to security of
a bargain is balanced against the public interest." Five factors, largely
16. 438 U.S. at 250-51. This decision marked only the third time since 1940 that the
Court invalidated state legislation under the Contract Clause. Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362
(1941), and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), were the previous
Supreme Court cases. United States Trust held that laws impairing public contracts should be
scrutinized carefully because of state self-dealing. Accord Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287,
294-96 (3d Cir. 1984) (higher Contract Clause scrutiny applies to public contracts than to
private contracts); Don't Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
696 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247,
1264-65 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal self-dealing) (dictum); Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employ-
ees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979) (en bane).
Allied Structural Steel applied the Contract Clause to a purely private contract, expanding the
reach of the Contract Clause well beyond the holding in United States Trust. Although a
regulated public utility, which might have been deemed a quasi-public entity, was a party to
the agreement in Energy Reserves, the Court treated the contract as a purely private bargain
because there was no suggestion of state self-dealing. 459 U.S. at 413 n.14.
17. 459 U.S. at 416-17 (deeming legitimate the state interest in protecting consumers from
the escalation of natural gas prices).
18. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
19. Id. at 445.
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indicia of public purpose, test the constitutionality of the state's action.
The legislation must: (1) serve a basic societal interest, not just benefit
some favored group; (2) be tailored to fit the public purpose; (3) be justi-
fied by an emergency; (4) be limited to the duration of that emergency;
and (5) be reasonable.2°
Yet Energy Reserves and Allied Structural Steel differ markedly in
how strictly they apply the Blaisdell factors. The Allied Structural Steel
opinion considered all five factors and refined the test even further.21
The Energy Reserves Court, in contrast, listed the factors in a footnote22
and explicitly pointed out that emergency action is merely a factor in the
decision and not a necessary requirement for upholding the state law.23
The Allied Structural Steel Court undertook a formally structured bal-
ancing test. By devoting careful attention to each factor undercutting the
state's claim of public interest, it indicated its intention to construe the
public interest narrowly and to scrutinize economic regulation closely.
The Energy Reserves Court adopted a casual rhetorical strategy, prefer-
ring to list the factors and announce its holding.
The difference between the rhetorical strategies adopted in these
cases is examined below in part IV. Even without employing the concep-
tual tools of that later section, a rhetorical difference between the two
decisions is apparent. This difference is encapsulated in the different
levels of scrutiny utilized to review legislation challenged under the Con-
tract Clause. The Allied Structural Steel majority required an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny: state legislation must be "necessary to meet an
important general social problem."'24 However, the Energy Reserves
Court relaxed the level of scrutiny: state economic legislation must
merely "have a significant and legitimate public purpose. "25
There is also a fundamental inconsistency in the assumptions that
both majorities make about market functions.26 Allied Structural Steel
20. Id. at 444-47.
21. 438 U.S. at 242. Allied Structural Steel refined one factor, that the legislature advance
a "basic" societal interest, into a requirement that the public interest justification be both "im-
portant" and "general." See infra text accompanying note 171.
22. 459 U.S. at 410 n.11.
23. Id. at 412; cf. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 249 n.24 (emergency need not be of
"great magnitude," suggesting by implication that a small emergency is necessary).
24. 438 U.S. at 247.
25. 459 U.S. at 411.
26. One commentator agrees that Allied Structural Steel allocates power between public
and private sectors, Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1414, 1420
n.43, 1423-25, 1431 (1984), but argues that Energy Reserves is best explained by a concern with
the allocation of power between legislative and judicial branches. Id. at 1426-29. Under this
view, state laws must be prospective and general to keep the legislature from usurping the
judicial function. Such an interpretation of legislative and judicial functions would form as
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was predicated on an unstated assumption that the Minnesota labor mar-
ket works well. Accordingly, the effect of a plant closing on the pension
plan must have been bargained for and agreed to in each labor contract.2 7
Only by this analysis does the contract reflect a personal choice that must
be protected from legislative impairment. Assuming the labor market
works well in Minnesota, there is no need for the remedial legislation
struck down in Allied Structural Steel. If courts assume all markets
work well, state legislatures must meet a heavy burden to justify regula-
tory and redistributive laws under the Constitution.
In contrast, the Energy Reserves decision reflected the Court's belief
that the Kansas legislation remedied a genuine defect in the marketplace.
Following deregulation, gas producers extracted extra profits by charging
utilities higher prices unrelated to any increase in production costs. 28
The electric utility was forced to pay exorbitant prices to a gas producer
due to a long-term contract with a price escalation clause that the parties
had agreed to in an earlier year, assuming government price regulation
would continue.29 Although a spot market reallocated gas following the
regulatory changes, transactions between producers and utilities were
governed by contracts that did not provide for allocation of natural gas
in the wake of deregulation. These transactions were not the product of
market forces. Rather, they were the accidental by-product of language
in contracts adopted in a specific regulatory environment. Prices did not
reflect negotiated contingencies as they would in an unregulated market,
but were governed by an unforeseen price-setting device. The contracts
became an arbitrary mechanism that produced a windfall gain to sellers
and an unforeseeable loss to buyers. When electricty prices rose as a
consequence, the state legislature acted. Where courts expect such legis-
lative responses, they test the constitutionality of the legislation at a low
level of scrutiny.30
radical a retrenchment as would a return to Lochner era views of the allocation of power
between public and private sectors. In the modern era, where both branches of government
must act to remedy market imperfections, judicial and legislative roles cannot be separated
based on norms of prospectivity and generality. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976). In any event, the view that the Contract
Clause regulates politics and not economics is inconsistent with the main thread of Contract
Clause jurisprudence outlined in part II of this Article. See also infra note 69.
27. See discussion of Allied Structural Steel in part III infra.
28. 459 U.S. at 415 (price rise prompted by demand shift).
29. Id.
30. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (economic legisla-
tion constitutional as long as "it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators"); J. HuRsT, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HIsToRY
33 (1982) ("judges normally have given economic regulatory legislation the full benefit of a
presumption of constitutionality").
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Energy Reserves and Allied Structural Steel, although decided only
five years apart, embody opposing attitudes toward redistribution. They
apply the Blaisdell tests with different degrees of strictness.3 They re-
flect inconsistent beliefs about the success of market allocations. 32 They
use different rhetorical strategies to formulate Contract Clause analysis.
33
As will be seen, they represent different approaches to the constitutional
interpretation of economic regulation.
II. Judicial Visions of Economic Life Shape the History of
Contract Clause Adjudication
No fixed point of constitutional interpretation governs the balance
between private rights and public needs. If the Supreme Court chose to
alter this fundamental balance, it could change the structure of economic
regulation in America. A Contract Clause case provides a vehicle for the
Court to constitutionalize its view of appropriate government regulation.
A comparison of leading Contract Clause cases of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries illustrates this point.
A. Ogden v. Saunders
Ogden v. Saunders, 4 an 1827 decision upholding the constitutional-
ity of a New York prospective debtor relief law, is a landmark case on
the subject of constitutional oversight of state economic regulation. The
Ogden Court squarely faced the problem of accommodating both public
interests and private rights. The Court's narrow majority3 5 secured all
existing contracts against interference from retrospective changes in state
legislation, but preserved room for state action to alter prospective con-
tracts.36 In his dissent, Chief Justice Marshall argued for an impregnable
wall around contracts to protect the private sphere from legislative inter-
ference. The different fears that motivated the majority and dissent in
Ogden recur whenever the Court debates the constitutionality of eco-
nomic regulation.
The Ogden majority feared adverse consequences if states were un-
able to act when confronted with economic emergencies. Justice Wash-
ington worried that with too much attention to private rights, "the
3 1. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
33. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
34. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
35. The Court split four to three, with Justices Washington, Johnson, Thompson, and
Trimble in the majority. Justices Duvall and Story joined Chief Justice Marshall in dissent.
This was the only major case in which Marshall dissented during his tenure on the Court.
36. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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sphere of State legislation upon subjects connected with the contracts of
individuals, would be abridged beyond what. .. States. . . would have
consented to . . . ."' Justice Johnson insisted that "the rights of all
must be held and enjoyed in subserviency to the good of the whole";3"
the public interest in justice and general welfare "must not be swallowed
up and lost sight of while yielding attention to the claim of the credi-
tor."39 These Justices felt that strict application of the Contract Clause
would paralyze states faced with social ills.4 This is the same unhappy
result modem writers accuse the Lochner era Court of fashioning.4'
In direct contrast, dissenting Chief Justice Marshall opposed even
prospective state bankruptcy laws because he feared state domination
over personal autonomy absent strict Contract Clause enforcement.42 In
Marshall's view, debtor relief laws enacted by state legislatures under the
Articles of Confederation had been "so alarming, as not only to impair
commercial intercourse . . . but to sap the morals of the people, and
destroy the sanctity of private faith."43  Any reading of the Contract
Clause that permitted "legislative interference with private rights"'
would render this fundamental constitutional protection an "inanimate,
inoperative, unmeaning clause."'45
The majority and dissent also differed over the breadth of the pro-
tection afforded by the Contract Clause. Each side defined its perception
of how future state actions could legitimately affect contracts. To the
Ogden majority, state law at the time of contracting automatically
formed a part of all contracts. Thus, all pre-existing contracts would be
protected by the Contract Clause. The legislature remained free, how-
ever, to serve the public interest by limiting the scope of future
contracts.4
37. 25 U.S. at 258.
38. Id. at 282 (Johnson, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. at 283, 287 (Johnson, J., concurring), 319-20, 321-22 (Trimble, J., concurring).
41. See, eg., G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADrroN 165-66 (1976) (Lochner
era adoption of "liberty of contract" principle "jeopardized much of the welfare legislation of
the early twentieth century").
42. 25 U.S. at 354-55 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 355.
44. Id. at 336.
45. Id. at 339.
46. Id. at 260-61 (Washington, J.), 285 (Johnson, J., concurring), 297 (Thompson, J.,
concurring), 324 (Trimble, J., concurring). This distinction between prospective and retrospec-
tive state law still resonates for modem courts. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 472-73 n.14 (1982) (dictum), and three cases striking retroactive laws:
Fortune v. Naval Weapons Center Fed. Credit Union, 652 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1981); Garris v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1980); Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co., 101 Wis.
Fall 19841
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Chief Justice Marshall argued that the majority's analysis would
lead to state domination over private rights. He reasoned that if all con-
tracts incorporate existing state law, then the state may circumvent Con-
tract Clause protections merely by passing a law subjecting all future
contracts to state modification at will.4 7 The Chief Justice proved correct
in this prediction. State constitutions and general incorporation laws
routinely require corporate charters to include such provisions, 48 even
though such charters are contracts between the state and private owners
and hence are subject to Contract Clause protection.49
Marshall believed that state domination over private rights could be
avoided only by declaring contractual rights independent of state law.5 0
In this respect, his Ogden dissent restates two 1819 opinions that he
wrote for the majority. Sturges v. Crowninshield5 invalidated a retro-
spective New York bankruptcy law, and Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward5 2 prohibited a state from altering the structure of a state-
chartered corporation to protect contractual expectations of the corpora-
tion's founding investors. Marshall would have permitted only those
state laws that impaired the remedy for breach of contract, so long as the
right to contract remained untouched.53 For example, a state could
abolish debtor's prison but could not release a person from any part of
his debt.54
Although the Ogden majority feared state paralysis, it still left the
balance between private rights and public interest skewed heavily in
2d 586, 304 N.W.2d 767 (1981); cf. Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918 (1984) (proposing the prohibition of retroactive contractual impairments absent
just compensation).
47. 25 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). This argument had previously been made
by Justice Story in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 692
(1819). Story concurred with Marshall in Ogden.
48. L. FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 125 (1973).
49. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); cf. M.
HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 11-14 (1977) (early
19th century shift in view of corporations, from public to private entities).
50. 25 U.S. at 346-47, 350 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
51. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). In Sturges, Marshall announced that the Contract
Clause went well beyond prohibiting the state debtor relief laws that troubled the Constitu-
tion's Framers; it "establish[ed] a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable." Id. at
206.
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). In Dartmouth College, Marshall declared that al-
lowing the state to alter the terms of a corporate charter would convert the contractual protec-
tion of private rights into "a machine entirely subservient to the will of government." Id. at
653.
53. Sturges, 17 U.S. at 200.
54. Id. at 200-01.
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favor of private rights. 5 While Marshall's right/remedy distinction and
his use of the Contract Clause to preserve private rights against state
legislation retained vitality throughout the nineteenth century, Ogden
carved out a small sphere of legitimate public action, facilitating the
Court's later expansion of state police power to promote economic
development.5
6
B. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,5 7 the Supreme
Court dramatically shifted the focus of Contract Clause doctrine and rec-
ognized the ability of state governments to act on behalf of the public
interest regardless of private contracts. The fundamental debate in Blais-
dell was reminiscent of Ogden, yet the Court reached a different result.
By the time Blaisdell was decided, the Contract Clause had lost
much of its vitality, shrinking from "perhaps the strongest single consti-
tutional check on state legislation during our early years as a nation ' 58 to
only a "minor" restraint. 9 States began to reserve the right to amend
corporate charters in franchise grants, as Chief Justice Marshall had
warned would occur in his Ogden dissent,' and to exercise their reserved
police powers. As a result, the Contract Clause became less attractive to
the Court as a doctrinal peg for restricting regulation. The Lochner era
Court chose instead to constitutionalize its view of "the liberty of con-
tract" through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
55. For decades after Ogden, until the general acceptance of the reserved powers doctrine
as described infra note 56, the Contract Clause was interpreted as a strong check on state
legislation. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: I, 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 533
(1944) (after Ogden, ban on laws impairing obligations of pre-existing contracts absolute);
Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311, 317-18 (1848) (state act affecting contract remedy
impairs obligation of contract); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866)
(same).
56. The Supreme Court often relied upon the concept of unalienable reserve powers of
states in mid-19th century Contract Clause decisions. See, eg., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 97 U.S.
659 (1878); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879).
57. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Blaisdell was decided three years before West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which reached the same result by removing the substantive due
process constraints on economic regulation that characterized the Lochner era. But cf. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (limiting substantive due process restraints on police power)
(decided two months after Blaisdell). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 450 (end of
Lochner era described).
58. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 241.
59. G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 561; see also B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: II, 57
HARv. L. REv. 852, 890-91 (1944).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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avoid the Contract Clause.6"
Blaisdell extended the constitutional scope of state police power be-
yond the traditional arena of health, safety, and morality to include laws
regulating injurious business practices.62 In Blaisdell, the Court upheld a
Minnesota statute enacted during the Depression that postponed resale
of foreclosed real estate and extended periods of redemption both retro-
spectively and prospectively. The Blaisdell majority attempted to har-
monize the constitutional prohibition against the states' impairment of
contractual obligation with the police power reserved to the states. 63 It
raised the fear of state paralysis, discussed in Ogden, commenting that a
state must "possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its peo-
ple." 6 Dissenting Justice Sutherland, motivated by the fear of state
domination, deemed the Blaisdell decision one of the most momentous of
his generation and accused the majority of failing to "see in it the poten-
tiality of. . . ever-advancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private
and public contracts., 65
Blaisdell and Ogden both depict a Supreme Court wrestling with the
appropriate role of state regulation in controlling business affairs.
Although a century separates the decisions, the same fundamental di-
lemma is confronted in each. How should the Court balance private
rights against public needs when interpreting the constitutionality of eco-
nomic regulation?
A comparison of the recent Allied Structural Steel and Energy
Reserves cases indicates that this dilemma continues to plague the Court.
Energy Reserves followed Blaisdell by emphasizing that the Contract
Clause "must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the
State. ' ' 66 Allied Structural Steel focused on the "limits upon the power of
the State . . . to abridge existing contractual relationships .... "I
This ongoing dispute is not an academic exercise; its resolution deter-
mines the scope of public powers and the extent of property rights.
61. B. WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 92, 95; Phillips, The Life and Times of the Contract
Clause, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 148-55 (1982).
62. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 432-34 (1934). The Blaisdell majority
cited precedent for protecting injurious business practices using state reserved powers, but it
largely appealed to public works cases. 290 U.S. at 437-39.
63. 290 U.S. at 435, 439; cf. id. at 442 (need to compromise individual rights and public
welfare).
64. Id. at 434.
65. Id. at 448 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); cf. B. WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 99 (contempo-
rary fear that Blaisdell gutted constitutional restrictions on legislative interference with
contracts).
66. 459 U.S. at 410.
67. 438 U.S. at 243.
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III. Private Rights and Perfect Markets: Revival of a Lochner
Era Judicial Vision
A. Judicial Beliefs and Economic Regulation6 8
Two factors influence constitutional decisions structuring economic
regulation: (1) a view of the appropriate balance between public and pri-
vate spheres, and (2) a perception of the market's ability to allocate re-
sources. 69 Courts may adopt either of two paradigm views about the first
factor, the public/private dichotomy. Either individual rights are supe-
rior to state interests or state interests are superior to individual rights.
Under the former view, property rights are never superseded by public
concerns. This view conflicts with judicial decisions requiring redistribu-
tion of social resources no matter how pressing the public need. Under
the latter view, private rights exist solely to promote social ends. For
example, one might argue that private property exists to induce owners
to care for the factors of production and to use them efficiently. But if a
superior public interest arises, the state may legitimately abridge such
property rights.
Courts may also adopt either of two paradigm views about the sec-
ond factor, the success of market resource allocations. One view is that a
68. This section draws on Professor Henry Steiner's course, Law in the Regulatory and
Welfare State, Harvard Law School, Spring 1981. In contrast to the view of this Article,
Steiner argues that Depression-era shifts in legal view emphasizing the public, systematic, and
group-oriented nature of law and social problems are irreversible, because they are connected
with a fundamental technological change requiring large-scale economic organization.
69. This Article makes no attempt to delineate the class of laws concerned with economic
regulation. While the Contract Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Commerce Clause
together regulate legislative action in the economic realm, the First Amendment governs laws
regulating the market for ideas, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses regulate
legislative acts affecting the political process. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976) (Equal Protection Clause regulates the political process not the economic market);
Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982) (preferring
political theory of Commerce Clause to economic theory). Some laws, like those limiting com-
mercial speech, concern more than one of these realms. Therefore, they should be tested inde-
pendently under the separate standard for each applicable constitutional clause.
Some recent commentators on the Contract Clause take the view that the Contract Clause
is intended to prevent state legislators from acting in the interest of private groups rather than
on behalf of the public good. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 5f U.
CHI. L. REv. 703 (1984); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1719-23 (1984); Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competi-
tion, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91, 126-27 (1983). This argument attempts to extend the
Contract Clause counter-revolution begun by Allied Structural Steel by applying the constitu-
tional provision to remedy failures in the political process rather than failures with economic
markets, a justification for this constitutional provision inconsistent with the main thread of
Contract Clause jurisprudence. In any event, a showing that a challenged law does not impair
the personal choice of contracting parties protects against the legislative factional bias these
authors fear.
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competitive free market ensures the proper allocation of resources. Al-
ternatively, markets may be viewed as inherently imperfect, beset with
economic problems like externalities and monopoly power.70
These beliefs comprise unarticulated judicial visions of economic
regulation. When the Supreme Court risks state paralysis by interpreting
the Constitution as favoring private economic freedoms, it stresses the
sanctity of private rights and assumes that markets work perfectly.
When the Court grants the public sphere priority in economic affairs, it
decides that the public interest takes precedence over private rights and
perceives markets as imperfect.
Shifts in judicial attitude toward the relative priority of private and
public rights are exemplified in the evolution of two branches of law: (1)
common law tort and contract principles and (2) the rise and fall of sub-
stantive due process analysis in constitutional adjudication.
L Contract Law and Tort Law
The shifting jurisprudential balance between public and private
spheres is evident in the evolution of tort and contract principles. In the
mid-nineteenth century, courts viewed each contract as crystallizing the
subjective will of its parties.71 Implicitly, this view defined tort law as
public policy ordering private affairs in situations where parties did not
contractually provide for rights and obligations. Tort law was sub-
servient to contract law since courts held private rights inviolate against
the state.72
By the first quarter of the twentieth century, this conception of con-
tract law had changed. Courts no longer restricted their task in contract
cases to enforcing private bargains. Instead, they implemented social
policy just as they did in cases involving tort law.7" Under this twentieth
century view, a judge would not enforce an express bargain if the public
interest and social fairness required otherwise. For example, at the end
70. Externalities are social costs or benefits not borne by the parties to a market transac-
tion. A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLrrz, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMIcS 348-49 (1980) (exter-
nalities exemplify market failure). Monopoly power consists of a firm's ability to raise price by
reducing output. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 8 (1980) (Chicago school of antitrust analysis
adopts economists' definition of monopolies power). In a perfect market, neither externalities
nor monopolies will exist.
71. For example, by 1825 a new doctrine of caveat emptor that strictly upheld the express
bargain had replaced an 18th century "sound price" doctrine based on an earlier "equitable
conception" of contract. M. HORWITZ, supra note 49, at 180.
72. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT 62-66 (1974) (describing the 1932 de-
bate between Corbin, representing the new view of contract law, and Williston, representing




of the nineteenth century, notions of implied contracts such as implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability cut back on the caveat emptor
doctrine.7' By the early twentieth century, courts imposed an implied
warranty on manufacturers of consumer products regardless of privity of
contract and independent of any express warranties made by the manu-
facturer to the dealer.75 Tort law took precedence over contract law,
and the intent of the parties became subservient to the needs of social
policy.
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2. Substantive Due Process
The collapse of the Lochner substantive due process approach to
economic regulation provides a concrete example of a shift in judicial
vision. It demonstrates both a change in the relative priority of public
and private spheres and a shift in the judicial view of the success of mar-
ket resource allocations. The contrast between the Supreme Court's
1915 decision in Coppage v. Kansas77 at the height of the Lochner era and
its 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,78 which brought the
Lochner era to a close, illustrates this shift.
In Coppage, the Court struck down a Kansas statute prohibiting
"yellow dog" contracts.79 The Court elevated private rights above state
interests, holding that "[t]he mere restriction of liberty or of property
rights cannot of itself be denominated 'public welfare,' and treated as a
legitimate object of the police power. . . ."0 In so deciding, the Court
assumed that markets were perfect and concluded that any interference
with the market necessarily interferes with the private sphere. It thus
stated that "the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to
procure employment . . . without a fair understanding,"81 yet the
worker is "free to decline"82 employment on "yellow dog" terms, "just as
the employer may decline to offer employment. . . [flor. . . '[i]t takes
two to make a bargain.'"83 Economic class distinctions do not prove
unequal bargaining power; they merely exhibit "those inequalities of for-
74. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at 473.
75. See, eg., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Car-
dozo, J.).
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
78. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
79. "Yellow dog" was the name given to contracts in which employers required employ-
ees to agree not to join unions as a condition of employment.
80. 236 U.S. at 19.
81. id. at 20.
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tune that are the necessary result" 4 of the operation of free contract and
private property.
In West Coast Hotel, the Court perceived both the law and the econ-
omy differently than it did in Coppage and thus found redistributive legis-
lation constitutional. The West Coast Hotel decision upheld a
Washington State minimum wage law for women and minors. The
Court found private rights subservient to the public good; private liberty
was "subject to the restraints . . . [of reasonable regulation] adopted in
the interests of the community . *. . ."" Hence, the Court held that
"[t]his essential limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of con-
tract in particular,"86 and it validated redistributive legislation in the
public interest. The Court justified minimum wage legislation by ex-
plaining, "[w]hat these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met."87 Thus, the Court
saw the market as imperfect. It recognized "[tihe exploitation of a class
of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining
power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living
wage.""8 The public good required this legislation because an imperfect
market failed to protect women and minors.
B. The Revival of Lochner Beliefs in the 1970's: Renewed Judicial Faith
in Markets and Sensitivity to Private Rights
By the time West Coast Hotel was decided, against the background
of the Great Depression and the apparent inability of the market to im-
prove economic conditions, the Supreme Court had adopted a belief in
the priority of public rights and a vision of imperfect markets. 89 These
beliefs, antithetical to Lochner era views, prevailed for a generation. 90 In
the 1970's, however, the judiciary began to turn away from the view of
superior public rights and favor the priority of private rights. This shift
marked the first significant departure from the judicial vision of the
1930's.
84. Id. at 17.
85. 300 U.S. at 391.
86. Id. at 392.
87. Id. at 399.
88. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
90. The Contract Clause did not form a significant barrier to state economic legislation
between 1940 and 1960. See, e.g., East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (uphold-
ig New York moratorium on mortgage foreclosures); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497 (1965) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 136-40).
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1. Reassertion of the Priority of Private Rights
In the 1970's the post-Depression judicial view that the public inter-
est outweighed private rights came under successful attack. This shift
reversed the positions of tort and contract law that had emerged early in
the twentieth century.91 Courts no longer automatically held contract
law subservient to the social policies of tort law. A brief survey of
Supreme Court cases decided under the "state action" doctrine demon-
strates this change.
In the 1948 decision of Shelley v. Kraemer,92 the state action doc-
trine reflected the priority of public rights. Shelley held that state en-
forcement of a racially restrictive covenant in a property contract
constituted state action inconsistent with the principles of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The enforcement of private contracts was "no less attrib-
utable to government when embodied in common law than when
expressed in statute or regulation."93  Thus, the law of contracts re-
flected social policy.
By 1970 the Court began to limit the use of the state action doctrine
to challenge private restrictions on property. In that year, the Court held
that a public park limited to whites by the terms of a private testamen-
tary trust would revest in the grantor's heirs rather than be converted to
an integrated facility. 94 Enforcing the trustor's discriminatory intent was
no longer state action, as it would have been under Shelley. Rather, the
Court merely was giving a written instrument the interpretation intended
by its maker. The Court held that the role of the state court was "to
effectuate as nearly as possible the explicit terms of [the] will." 95
91. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
92. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
93. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 694; see also Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982).
94. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
95. Id. at 444. Later cases continued to reduce the scope of state action by viewing con-
tract remedies as effectuating private rights rather than social policy. Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (California
commercial code codification of common law contract rule allowing self-help repossession is
not state action); Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (remedy under New York
Uniform Commercial Code is not state action); see also Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory:
A Case Note on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982) (Flagg Bros. incon-
sistent with view that contract law is social policy). Similarly, the Supreme Court has broad-
ened the protection accorded private property rights against countervailing public interest
claims under the public function test of state action. Compare Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (protecting speech at private shopping
center because of center's public function) with Hudgen's v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (over-
ruling Logan Valley). See generally Note, Creditors' Remedies as State Action, 89 YALE L.J.
538, 543 n.30 (1980) (discussing public function test).
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In 1974, the Court confirmed its view of contract as private law in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 96  The Court held that despite an
extensive scheme of state regulation over a power company, the terms of
a consumer's private contract with that company were not state action
subject to due process analysis. 97 These later state action cases suggest
that contract notions favoring private rights are reasserting their potent
influence in areas previously dominated by tort principles.
2. The New Market Vision of Allied Structural Steel
To the extent judicial opinions now reflect an analysis tipped in
favor of private rights over public interests, one of the two principles
behind Lochner era decisions has returned to prominence. In the context
of this conceptual shift, Allied Structural Steel is of tremendous impor-
tance because it provides the first evidence of a concomitant change in
the other key principle, the judicial perception of how effectively markets
allocate resources. 98 It is hard to overestimate the importance this sec-
ond shift ultimately could have for the structure of economic regulation
when viewed in conjunction with the recent renewal of judicial belief in
the priority of private rights. A judicial counter-revolution may be in the
making that could approach Lochner era extremes. 99
96. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
97. Idt at 358; cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (state
ownership alters result in Jackson).
98. The view that markets work well has been advanced in the "law and economics"
literature following the publication of Coase's article on the role of property rights in the
opertion of markets. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960); G.E.
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 218-19 (1980) (in contrast to earlier view that a market
approach to defective products is inappropriate, 1970's torts scholarship assumes that when
consumers have good information, the market can allocate risks sensibly); cf. RATIONAL Ex-
PECTATIONS AND ECONOMETRIC PRACTICE (R. LucAs, JR. & T. SARGENT ed. 1981) (mod-
em macroeconomics has also produced a perfect markets theory challenging the imperfect
markets view of Keynes and his followers). But see Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905, 908 (1980) (conservatives seek "to use contractarian ideol-
ogy to turn back the recent triumph of strict liabiity").
99. The Lochner era is known for its judicial activism in overruling legislation as well as
for its judicial vision of private rights and perfect markets. See, e.g., Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 48, at 311. But cf L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 435 (idea of Lochner era hostility to
legislation has been oversold). In terms of the analytic tools of this Article, periods of judicial
activism and judicial restraint do not arise as independent ideological movements. Rather,
judicial activism occurs when the courts disagree with the legislatures on the effectiveness of
markets and on the priority of public or private interests. For example, the 1960's were char-
acterized by judicial restraint in response to constitutional challenges to economic legislation,
as both courts and legislatures believed that economic markets needed legislative intervention.
However, at the same time the judicial branch was active in overruling racially restrictive
legislation; courts believed that the political process and its legislative product did not ade-
quately represent minorities, necessitating judicial intervention.
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In Allied Structural Steel, the Supreme Court held that the Minne-
sota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act unconstitutionally impaired
employment contracts. The Act imposed obligations on a company that
the majority termed "conspicuously beyond those that it had voluntarily
agreed to undertake."'" The Act required employers to fund pensions
for certain employees whose rights had not yet vested, in the event the
employer terminated its Minnesota operations. The Court concluded
that this requirement "compelled the employer to exceed bargained-for
expectations and nullified an express term of [its own] pension plan."' 01
Despite this conclusory language, the majority did not inquire whether
the effect of a plant closing on the pension plan was actually considered
during employment contract negotiations.
The Allied Structural Steel majority confirmed the recent trend to-
ward acknowledging the priority of private rights over public needs.
They focused on personal choice as the value protected by contract. 0 2
"Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and business affairs
according to their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those
rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are enti-
tled to rely on them."' 03 To find personal choice in the specific contract
it protected, the Allied Structural Steel Court must have relied on an
implicit faith in efficient market resource allocations. For, as the dissent
pointed out, it is difficult to understand how the employer's obligations to
workers in the event of a plant closing were chosen by either party to that
agreement. '4
The absence of explicit faith in market efficiency in the majority
opinion can be detected by demonstrating how specific contractual provi-
sions reflect the personal choice of the contracting parties. The fact that
a contract allocates rights and duties between parties does not necessarily
mean that party choice has been implemented. One of three additional
circumstances must be found before it can be determined that parties
chose the allocation of rights, duties, and resources of their contract. Per-
sonal choice is clearly manifested in the contract if the allocation of re-
sources in the event of some contingency is bargained over explicitly.
100. 438 U.S. at 240.
101. Id. at 246 n.18.
102. This is the value which, according to liberal political theory, contract law protects.
See generally C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-17 (1981).
103. 438 U.S. at 245; cf Phillips, supra note 61, at 176 (Allied Structural Steel signals
judicial interest in protection of private rights).
104. 438 U.S. at 253 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited the fact that Allied
did not consider the possibility of a plant's closing as an actuarial assumption in calculating its
annual contributions to the pension plan as evidence that the contingency fell "outside the
range of normal expectations of both the employer and the employee."
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Personal choice also manifests itself in a second circumstance: when the
contract's terms are applied in the event of a contingency that was fore-
seen by the parties at the time of contracting even if no explicit allocation
for that event was made. Arguably, applying a contractual term also
preserves party choice in a third circumstance: if the triggering event
was foreseeable by the parties at the time of contracting, even absent evi-
dence that the parties actually foresaw or explicitly bargained over the
risk.10 5
The risk that triggered the Minnesota statute invalidated in Allied
Structural Steel, a plant closing, does not fit any of these categories. The
remedial Minnesota statute affected an employer's pension obligations
only in the event that it closed a plant. This risk that Allied would be
105. Finding market failure forms a necessary prerequisite for legislative intervention to
lead to efficient resource allocation. Market failure can occur in a decentralized system if the
market does not allow firms, consumers, and workers to insure against every contingency. See,
e.g., Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 R. EcoN.
STUD. 91 (1964). Since transaction costs, imperfect information, and incentive problems pro-
hibit the sale of third party insurance or the establishment of futures markets in most impor-
tant contingencies, efficient resource allocation typically occurs only if the affected parties
bargain at arm's length. For example, no one would insure a firm like Allied Structural Steel
against the possibility that it would close a plant because that contingency is under the firm's
complete control. Nor can the workers at any plant purchase third party insurance to hedge
against that threat because the transaction costs of writing such a policy would be prohibitive.
A market transaction insuring against the plant closing could only have occurred if it were
bargained for by the parties. Thus, under an efficiency-based analysis of the Contract Clause,
finding the absence of a bargain in the impaired contract justifies remedial legislation.
To improve economic efficiency, legislative intervention must also satisfy a second test.
Even if the original contract did not take into account the possible occurrence of some later
event, as long as (1) contract renegotiation is costless, and (2) the contract damage remedy
gives parties the correct breach and reliance incentives, then renegotiation will lead to an effi-
cient allocation of resources despite the occurrence of an unforeseen contingency. See gener-
ally A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 25-36 (1983). However,
this second decentralized efficiency-producing mechanism is often absent because contract re-
negotiation following a contingency like a plant closing is costly-imagine the steel producer
bargaining about pensions with laid-off workers. In sum, from an economic efficiency perspec-
tive, a state law altering contracts on account of a contingency improves resource allocation
only if two often-found conditions hold: (1) markets do not work perfectly when contracts are
written, and (2) markets work poorly when contracts are renegotiated.
Three important points about efficiency analysis deserve special note. First, state inter-
vention to achieve a more efficient allocation- for example, reducing the costs of private rene-
gotiations-may improve social resource allocation even if the legislature cannot achieve the
"first best" allocation in every particular case. Thus, state laws need not be perfect to be
successful. Second, only those efficient market resource allocations arrived at by bargaining
manifest personal choice. Ex post reallocations, whether undertaken legislatively or through
decentralized contract breach and renegotiation do not satisfy the liberal personal choice value
grounding contract law. Therefore, the first prerequisite for an efficiency-producing legislative
intervention is a sufficient test for proving absence of personal choice in private bargains. Fi-
nally, efficiency-based analysis takes no position on whether purely redistributive legislative
transfers of wealth are socially beneficial.
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forced to shut down was not allocated by the parties when each labor
contract was made. It was surely not contemplated at the time the cov-
ered employees were hired. 106 It was probably not even foreseeable at
that time.107 Thus, the contract could not have reflected the personal
choice of the steel firm or its employees in the event of a plant closing.
This inquiry into the Allied Structural Steel agreement shows that
the allocation of rights and duties in the event of a plant closing cannot
be considered the product of contract negotiations allocating that risk.
Yet the Supreme Court assumed the contract embodied a bargain over
party rights and duties in all events, including a plant closing.10 8 The
majority believed that Minnesota labor markets operated so well that
each contract's operation in any imaginable future event-including a
plant closing-was chosen by the parties. The Court's decision could be
predicated only on a general faith in the success of market resource
allocations.
In the latest major Contract Clause decision, Energy Reserves, the
Court does not exhibit the same faith in markets as shown in Allied
Structural Steel. In upholding a price ceiling on natural gas sales, Energy
Reserves distinguished Allied Structural Steel on grounds that avoid a
direct confrontation with the earlier Court's view of perfect markets.
The Court stated that the law invalidated in Allied Structural Steel did
not deal with an important social problem and was focused too narrowly
to be in the public interest.109 At the same time, the Energy Reserves
Court accepted explicit legislative redistribution favoring consumers as a
legitimate state goal, implicitly endorsing the priority of public needs
over private property rights.' 10 By narrowing the precedential effect of
106. See supra note 104.
107. The pension plan had been in operation at least a decade before the plant closed. 438
U.S. at 237, 246 n.18.
108. The majority referred to the company's reliance on its legitimate contractual expecta-
tions, 438 U.S. at 246, without investigating how the parties expected their agreement to apply
in the event of a plant closing.
109. 459 U.S. at 412 n. 13. The cases could also be distinguished by noting that the Court
sustained state regulation of the industry with a history of regulation. Compare Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 413 with Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 249 (history of regulation
differs). See Case Comment, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 62
WASH. U.L.Q. 179, 188 (1984) (Energy Reserves deference to state legislation may be limited
to laws affecting regulated industries). However, this distinction identifies doctrine with actual
behavior, a logically unacceptable device. See infra note 175.
Since Energy Reserves, the Third Circuit has attempted to narrow the application of Al-
lied Structural Steel on all conceivable grounds. In Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 299 (3d
Cir. 1984), the Allied Structural Steel holding was limited to cases where (1) markets in fact
work well so bargains reflect personal choice, (2) the state law does not address a broad social
problem, and (3) the state is regulating a new area.
110. 459 U.S. at 416-17.
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Allied Structural Steel and endorsing redistribution, the Energy Reserves
Court signaled its view that markets may require remedial state action.
In other words, the terms of private contracts need not always be applied
as written.
Although Energy Reserves recognized that markets may not work
well, the decision does not foreclose the Supreme Court from further
elaboration of Allied Structural Steel. The Court could reaffirm its views
of perfect markets and the priority of private rights in future Contract
Clause cases by reading Energy Reserves narrowly, emphasizing that the
parties to that particular contract anticipated that their agreement would
incorporate future state price regulation because the industry was already
heavily regulated."' The Court stated that the gas producer "knew its
contractual rights were subject to alteration by state price regulation"; 1 2
price regulation was "foreseeable as the type of law that would alter con-
tract obligations." 1 3
IV. Contract Clause Doctrine: A Connection Between Form
and Substance
The conflict between Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves
over the success of market allocations and the role of private rights cen-
ters on the doctrinal test of Contract Clause violation. Each opinion for-
mulated that doctrine to reflect its own perception of the appropriate
balance between public needs and private rights. This doctrinal dispute
is a longstanding feature of constitutional history. 1 4 This section exam-
ines the rhetorical styles employed in the Allied Structural Steel and En-
ergy Reserves opinions in light of their historical context.
A. Analytic and Conclusory Contract Clause Doctrine Before Allied
Structural Steel
Both Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves formulate Contract
Clause doctrine in terms of a Blaisdell-type balancing test. In the nine-
teenth century, Contract Clause doctrine normally was promulgated in
terms of classification tests.11 5 However, the difference in doctrinal style
cuts across this distinction; it applies equally to balancing tests and clas-
sification tests. That difference lies in the Court's understanding of the
role of its doctrinal test when applying the law.
111. But see supra note 109 (doubting the logical coherence of this distinction).
112. 459 U.S. at 416.
113. Id.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 115-40.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 119-24.
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The test may be deemed "analytic" if it classifies legal and illegal
activities. In a Contract Clause case a court must distinguish between
legislation within the permissible public sphere and legislation that un-
constitutionally impairs private rights. Analytic doctrinal tests are em-
ployed by courts that believe the distinction between constitutional and
unconstitutional laws is intuitive and obvious.' 16 Alternatively, courts
that find these classifications difficult, arbitrary, or not apparent use rea-
soned judgment to apply what may be termed "conclusory" doctrinal
tests. 
17
Historically Contract Clause opinions have used classification tests
and balancing tests in both analytic and conclusory manners. 18 The dis-
cussion below surveys changing Contract Clause tests to highlight shifts
in rhetorical style and points out the roots of the doctrinal dispute be-
tween Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves.
The Ogden dispute119 involved competing analytic classifications.
The majority proposed a prospective/retrospective test: only state laws
that operate prospectively on contracts could satisfy the Contract
Clause.12 Chief Justice Marshall in dissent preferred a right/remedy
distinction: state law may alter the remedy for breach of contract but
may not infringe upon the right.121 Both of these tests present "logical"
classification schemes for detecting Contract Clause violations. The de-
termination under either scheme is seen by its proponents as natural, in-
tuitive and obvious; it is analytic.
Justice Washington used his Ogden opinion to point out a difficulty
with Marshall's classification scheme. He believed Marshall's
right/remedy scheme could be read to make all state legislation violative
of the Contract Clause because courts would not admit the existence of
cases difficult to classify, although no law merely alters the remedy with-
out impairing the contractual right to some degree. 122 For example, if a
state declares that no remedy exists for the breach of certain contracts,
that statute necessarily limits the right to form such contracts. Justice
Washington did not elevate this difficulty into a general critique of logical
classification tests. His own prospective/retrospective distinction is prey
116. See infra notes 142-67 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 34-56.
120. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 262 (Washington, J.), at 326 (Trimble, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 349-54 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 261 (Washington, J.) (arguing that any limitation on the remedy for breach of
contract necessarily limits the contractual right); cf. id. at 350 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)
(responding to this argument). *
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to a similar argument. A state law that attempts to forbid only future
bankruptcy protections hurts those entrepreneurs who have already re-
lied on the expectation of limited personal liability by suddenly raising
the risks they had assumed and limiting their right to earn an antici-
pated future return. Such a law operates in part retroactively despite its
intent.
Similarly, any attempt to classify state statutes into separate public
and private spheres by logical distinctions founders. Either the test must
be read to make all of the classified phenomena fill one of the spheres, or
difficult cases make the classification scheme appear arbitrary and illogi-
cal. Despite this difficulty, such analytic tests seem intuitive and aestheti-
cally satisfying to human minds,' 23 and the analytic right/remedy
distinction persisted in Contract Clause jurisprudence during the nine-
teenth century. 124
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court no
longer accepted the right/remedy classification as intuitive. In 1867, in
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,'25 the Court publicly expressed its
doubts as to the "consistency and soundness"'126 of the distinction be-
tween right and remedy. Hoffman invalidated an Illinois statute limiting
a city property tax that the city had previously pledged to secure bonds.
The Court was intimidated by the authority favoring the old doctrine, a
doctrine "supported by such an array of judicial names that it is hard for
the mind not to feel constrained to believe they are correct."' 27  The
Court discussed an alternative doctrinal route to preserve private rights,
but did not adopt this alternative.1 28 It proposed only to view "direct"
impairments of contracts as grounds for invalidating state law; indirect
123. See generally W.V. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 123 (1969) (fundamental linguistic classifications seem intuitive). Whether
courts believe that mechanical application of doctrinal tests works successfully is a question of
common perception. The referents of doctrinal legal tests are set by arbitrary social agreement
rather than by logical analysis. Even an arbitrary classification can stick despite its logical
problems. Compare id. with W.V. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL
POINT OF VIEW 42-43 (2d ed. 1964) (the reference of individual terms or sentences is indeter-
minate) and H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 33 (1981) (same). Hence, the broad
outlines of any dichotomy employed in a constitutional doctrine will appear analytic to most
observers, regardless of the arbitrariness in deciding any particular case. But cf. Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1982)
(once distinctions are exploded, analytic view can never be recaptured).
124. See generally B. WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 27-61.
125. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
126. Id. at 554.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 553-54 (rejecting as contrary to precedent a Contract Clause construction that
would prohibit only "direct" impairments while allowing legislation that affects contracts "in-
cidentally" or "only by consequence").
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burdens would be constitutional. 129
The direct/indirect doctrine marked a new idea in the rhetoric of
Contract Clause decisions. The Court suggested implicitly in Hoffman
what it later admitted explicitly in 1880: "It is not always easy to tell on
which side of the line which separates governmental from property rights
a particular case is to be put . . ,"10 Classification into public and
private spheres no longer was understood as intuitive. The Court in
Hoffman proposed a conclusory test to protect the core of the private
sphere from infringement. This direct/indirect or "core and penumbra"
approach to a classification test differed from the logical classification
approach because it avoided complete domination by one sphere. A
court employing it necessarily admits that some decisions must be arbi-
trary. The cores of the public and private spheres, however, cannot be
sharply distinguished from each other just as the spheres themselves
could not be distinguished in the earlier doctrine. Despite the Hoffman
suggestion of analyzing doctrine in terms of inviolate core and less pro-
tected penumbra, nineteenth century Contract Clause doctrine never de-
parted from the logical classification of spheres that characterized the
Marshall era."' Perhaps this is because the general decline in use of the
Contract Clause to invalidate state legislation gave little occasion for
doctrinal elaboration.
In its 1934 Blaisdell decision the Supreme Court shifted from a clas-
sification test to a balancing test. 32 This shift was roughly concurrent
with the introduction of balancing tests in other areas of the law.'33 The
Depression era Supreme Court disowned both the right/remedy classifi-
cation '34 and the direct/indirect distinction. '35  Classification tests of
both the logical analytic variety and the conclusory/"core and penum-
bra" form were rejected in favor of judicial weighing and balancing of
interests and equities.
129. Id. at 553.
130. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820-21 (1880) (upholding reserved police powers of
the state).
131. See, eg., id. at 821 (admitting difficulty of classification in principle, but not troubled
by facts at issue).
132. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. Justice Black preferred not to under-
stand the Blaisdell doctrine as a balancing test so that he could cite it as precedent for his own
preference for classification tests. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 524 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting). With its emphasis on harmonizing the reserved power with contractual rights, the
doctrine is clearly a balancing test. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
133. The Rule of Reason was read into antitrust law in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Nuisance law also incorporated a balancing test in the early 20th century.
M. HoRwrrZ, supra note 49, at 293 n.73 (citing a 1934 case).
134. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
135. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
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Like classification tests, balancing tests may be applied in either a
conclusory or analytic manner. If a court admits that some cases are
difficult and require judgment, then it will apply an "unstructured," or
conclusory, balancing test. Unstructured balancing is characteristic of
twentieth century Contract Clause decisions.
An unstructured balancing test appeared in City of El Paso v. Sim-
mons.1 "6 This 1965 Contract Clause case upheld the constitutionality of a
Texas statute reducing the time period in which landowners could rein-
state property forfeited for nonpayment of a debt owed the state. The El
Paso Court admitted that applying the Contract Clause required judg-
ment because of the interpenetration of public and private spheres.137
The opinion made light of suggestions of invading the private sphere and
gave great weight to evidence indicating public benefit from the chal-
lenged legislation. The Court described the act as "hardly burden-
some"' 138 to contracting parties "but nonetheless an important one to the
State's interest."13 9 This statement suggests an ex post facto justification
for the Court's holding rather than a true analysis leading to that hold-
ing. The opinion simply concludes that "[tihe Contract Clause does not
forbid such a measure." 14
Alternatively, a court could apply a balancing test in a "structured"
manner and analytically classify public and private spheres.1 41 As dis-
cussed below, the Court came close to employing a structured balancing
test in Allied Structural Steel, but reverted to an unstructured test in En-
ergy Reserves.
B. Defining Property and Protecting Rights
The doctrinal formulation of the Contract Clause violation "test"
aids in understanding Allied Structural Steel as a shift in the Supreme
Court's view of markets. The Contract Clause doctrine set forth in Al-
lied Structural Steel appears to reject conclusory balancing for an ana-
lytic test. This test is particularly associated with the vision of perfect
markets that characterizes the substance of the opinion.
136. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
137. Id. at 507.
138. Id. at 516-17.
139. IL; cf. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2304-07 (1983) (state statute prohib-
iting oil and gas producers from contracting to shift tax burden to customers does not impair
private contracts).
140. 379 U.S. at 517.
141. See Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. Rnv.
1022, 1049 (1978) (proposing that courts "define and refine the weights" put into balance
rather than engage in "ad hoc balancing").
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There is a strong logical connection between a court's rhetorical
style and its vision of market effectiveness. Markets work best when
everything is tradeable, a situation that requires well-defined property
rights. When a court intuitively defines property, it is likely to assume
that markets work well and that classifying activities as public or private
is obvious, intuitive, and analytic. But if a court must use reasoned judg-
ment to define arbitrary property lines, it will have difficulty separating
public and private realms. Hence, it will employ a conclusory doctrine to
separate spheres. The court will question whether property with indeter-
minate boundaries can be traded and therefore will view markets as
imperfect.
14 2
Two Contract Clause cases decided a century apart illustrate the
link between rhetorical style and markets vision. In both cases, the
Supreme Court addressed centrally, although not expressly, this funda-
mental problem of defining, or "bounding," property. In Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,143 decided in 1837, the Court interpreted a state
franchise for a toll bridge as nonexclusive. Although the majority did
not claim the state had a reserved power to grant a competing franchise,
it held that the original grant must be construed as nonexclusive absent
express indication from the legislature.'"
In the view of the Justices deciding Charles River Bridge, an exclu-
sive franchise was a well-defined concept. 45 Defining the extent of the
nonexclusive franchise for the purpose of determining when beneficial
competition becomes unacceptable trespass, or when competition be-
comes illegitimate taking if promoted by state grant, constituted a stick-
ier issue. Thus, the majority in Charles River Bridge used reasoned
judgment to define the extent of the nonexclusive franchise and employed
conclusory doctrine to separate private and public spheres. This point is
made succinctly by Justice McLean, concurring with the opinion of the
Court: "The right granted to the Charles River Bridge Company, is,
.. .to a certain extent, exclusive; but to measure this extent, presents
the chief difficulty."' 146 McLean argued that the franchise extended a
142. Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1685, 1738-41 (1976) (proposing "rhetorical analogy" between style and substance). One
might read Kennedy's individualism/altruism dichotomy as stating this Article's state paraly-
sis/state domination poles in connotatively favorable form. If so, the present discussion refines
Kennedy's theoretical argument by identifying the perfect or imperfect market vision aspect of
that dichotomy as providing the crucial link with rhetorical form.
143. 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 420 (1837).
144. Id. at 548-49 (Taney, C.J.).
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"reasonable distance" above and below the physical timbers of the origi-
nal bridge. The distance "must not be so great as to subject the public to
serious inconvenience, nor so limited as to authorize a ruinous competi-
tion." 47 He chose a conclusory test to measure impairment of the bridge
franchis because of the less bounded nature of the property right that
defined the private sphere.
In contrast, dissenting Justice Story had no difficulty defining the
property right as an exclusive franchise. He asked "what limits can be
assigned to such a franchise? The answer is obvious ... ,148 By di-
verting traffic, a new bridge "would be a nuisance to the old bridge, [and]
would be within the reach of its exclusive right." 14 9 Story used an ana-
lytic test because the property limits appeared obvious to him, and land-
based nuisance law applied intuitively. "There is nothing new in such
expositions of incorporeal rights," he concluded. 150
Modem economics associates competition with perfect markets and
monopoly with imperfect markets. This association, however, is mislead-
ing for understanding the market view held by early nineteenth century
Justices. Story required an exclusive franchise to support his view that
markets work well. The recipient of the original franchise made a fair
bargain with the legislature to assume the risks of development in ex-
change for a right to the proceeds. No private party would have ac-
cepted a franchise qualified by nonexclusive right. Story asked
rhetorically, what legislature "would ever have dreamed of such a qualifi-
cation of its own grant. . . when it sought to enlist private capital and
private patronage to insure the accomplishment of it?" 5 '
The majority's preference for a nonexclusive franchise betrayed its
view that markets required state action to remedy market failure. If such
state franchises were deemed exclusive, an inefficient spectacle would oc-
cur. One would "soon find the old turnpike corporations awakening
from their sleep, and calling upon this Court to put down the improve-
ments which have taken their place." '152 Story's well-defined conception
of property boundaries connected an analytic classification of public and
private spheres with a perfect market vision. But when the majority
147. Id. at 564. McLean measured infringement of the original franchise by the loss in
value in its toll receipts, not by its physical distance from the competing bridge. Id. at 565.
148. Id. at 614 (Story, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 615. In modem terms this market system of bidding for an exclusive right
would be called competition "for the field." See, e.g., Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L.
& EcoN. 55 (1968).
152. 36 U.S. at 552-53.
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viewed property as not well-defined or lacking specific boundaries, a con-
clusory classification of spheres accompanied an imperfect market vision.
Two consequences of the Charles River Bridge majority view that
unassisted markets typically did not work well illustrate the practical im-
portance of judicial vision. First, because the state intervened to remedy
market failure, the reserved police powers doctrine that flourished later
in the nineteenth century is a direct descendant of the Charles River
Bridge holding. 53 Second, government-promoted competition remedied
the market imperfection in Charles River Bridge; thus, since 1837, com-
petition rather than monopoly has promoted American economic
development. 154
A century later the Court again implicitly faced the problem of de-
fining incorporeal property in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell. 1 5 Blaisdell extended the reserved powers of the state to cover
the regulation of injurious business practices." 6 In determining the scope
of the mortgagee's (creditor's) rights that were free from state interven-
tion, the Court defined the creditor's property right. The majority ex-
plained that the core of the mortgage right was not infringed by
extending the period of redemption. The obligation for interest and the
right to obtain a deficiency judgment remained. Only the penumbra of
the right was affected. "Aside from the extension of time, the other con-
ditions of redemption are unaltered."1 57 Like the holding in Charles
River Bridge, this reasoning required judgment; the lines drawn were not
intuitive.
The Blaisdell dissent considered the bounds of the property right to
be obvious, not dependent on any judgment of reasonableness.
"[W]hether the statute operated directly upon the contract or indirectly
by modifying the remedy, its effect was to extend the period of redemp-
tion. That this brought about a substantial change in the terms of the
contract reasonably cannot be denied."15
Motivated by an imperfect market vision and an inability to define
property easily, the Blaisdell majority adopted a conclusory, unstruc-
tured balancing test to separate private and public spheres. The dissent,
153. J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 84-85 (1982) (citing
Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 547).
154. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 49, at 130-39. Antitrust laws that promote development by
competition rather than monopoly have philosophical roots in this case.
155. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 57-65.
157. 290 U.S. at 425 (Hughes, C.J.); cf. id. at 438 (obligation/remedy distinction is one of
"reasonableness").
158. Id. at 480 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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believing it knew the bounds of the property right, would have used a
logical classification between right and remedy,159 defending the perfect
market vision of the Lochner era.
The connection between economic vision and rhetorical style aids in
understanding the history of Contract Clause cases. The main thread of
nineteenth century Contract Clause doctrine employed analytic classifi-
cation schemes such as the right/remedy or prospective/retrospective
distinctions, concurrent with a perfect market vision."6 Only toward the
end of the century did a direct/indirect test emerge.1 6' The emergence of
this test coincided with the rise of the large corporation and its market
power and with the development of the reserved powers doctrine, which
gave legislatures the tools to remedy market failure. 162 This conclusory
classification test demonstrated that the Court had difficulty separating
private and public spheres. It viewed markets as imperfect; thus it had
trouble defining the limits of property. 163  The Lochner era Supreme
Court then returned to a perfect market view, protecting "the liberty of
contract" from state infringement.'" In the Great Depression judges
once again switched, viewing markets as imperfect and overthrowing
Lochner.165 Conclusory, unstructured balancing tests therefore charac-
terize later twentieth century Contract Clause cases. 166
As is shown below, Allied Structural Steel partially returned to an
analytic test by structuring a balancing test to determine Contract Clause
violations. The structure of the doctrine in that case confirmed the
Court's conclusion that markets work well. Since Allied Structural Steel,
courts have relied on an analytic distinction between the retrospective
and prospective effects of state statutes in Contract Clause cases. 16 7
They have adopted a logical classification, Ogden-type test even though
the retrospective holding in Blaisdell should have foreclosed this option.
Energy Reserves halted the trend toward a structured Contract
Clause balancing test. By returning to a conclusory balancing test and
159. Id.
160. See generally supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
162. A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 285 (1977) (modern industrial enterprise,
integrating mass production with mass distribution, grew "to dominate many of the nation's
most vital industries" between 1880 and 1910); see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
163. Cf. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (incorporeal property is difficult to define, but judicial restraint considera-
tions made judicial remedy for market failure inadvisable).
164. See supra notes 8, 99 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 77-88.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
167. See supra note 46.
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endorsing legislative redistribution, the opinion suggested that the Court
has had second thoughts about its recent perfect market vision. Within
only five years, the Supreme Court has taken opposite views on the fun-
damental issue of market effectiveness, indicating this shift by changing
its rhetorical style.
C. Differing Rhetorical Strategies in Allied Structural Steel and Energy
Reserves
Allied Structural Steel retreated from an unstructured balancing test
in three respects, suggesting that the distinction between public and pri-
vate spheres is logical and intuitive rather than arbitrary. First, the Al-
lied Structural Steel Court applied the balancing test as if it were a per se
rule: if the contractual impairment is minimal, sufficient public purpose
to justify the legislation under the Constitution can be presumed.168 Sec-
ond, the Allied Structural Steel Court clarified the Blaisdell balance by
specifically applying each element.1 69 The careful articulation of public
interest factors in Allied Structural Steel's analysis stands in stark con-
trast to the almost totally hidden balance in El Paso.170 Finally, the Al-
lied Structural Steel Court refines the analysis of the individual balancing
factors into small-scale logical classification tests. For example, the
Court transforms the "basic" societal interest required by Blaisdell into
one that is both "important" and "general." 71 The Court implied that
each factor could be determined by intuitive logic and then weighted to
yield an analytic conclusion about Contract Clause violation.172 This fea-
ture of the Allied Structural Steel doctrine, a more structured balancing
test, is dispensed with in Energy Reserves where the public interest must
be "significant" and "legitimate." '173 These are conclusory terms rather
than small-scale logical classification tests.
If the Allied Structural Steel Court intended to create a balancing
test which could be used to determine analytically Contract Clause viola-
tions, it only moved part way toward its goal. The per se nature of its
168. 438 U.S. at 245 n.17 (dictum). This per se rule has frequently been used to dismiss
cases since Allied Structural Steel. See, eg., Insurer's Action Council v. Markman, 653 F.2d
344 (8th Cir. 1981); Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980); Rowell v. Harleysville
Mut. Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 108, 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978), overruled, 294 S.E. 2d 336, 340 (1982).
169. 438 U.S. at 242, 247-50.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
171. 438 U.S. at 247. But cf. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17
(1977) (remedy/obligation distinction treated as rule of thumb rather than as analytic test).
172. By selectively quoting language from El Paso, described supra at text accompanying
notes 136-40, the Allied Structural Steel majority reinterpreted that example of unstructured
balancing as if it were analytic. 438 U.S. at 243 n.14.
173. 459 U.S. at 411.
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doctrinal test appeared only as dictum since the challenged statute was
found unconstitutional. The majority did not explain which indicia of
public purpose would be most convincing, leaving the weight of each
factor unknown. Furthermore, characterizing the Minnesota legislation
as narrow in focus is controversial, unlike intuitive classification
schemes. Nevertheless, in Allied Structural Steel the Supreme Court
came closer to adopting the Ogden analytic doctrinal test of Contract
Clause violation than it has come at any time since the Great Depression.
A rhetorical device as old as Ogden utilizes a circular and incoher-
ent reliance on the disruption of actual expectations to determine con-
tractual impairment. The device does not prevent a court from invoking
its judicial vision. Rather, it merely obscures the theory on which the
decision is based. The Allied Structural Steel majority employed this de-
vice when it tested contractual impairment by the cost of disrupting set-
tled expectations.174 However, the device could not entirely hide that
Court's view of market efficiency. Indeed, the logical incoherence of this
rhetorical device requires a court eventually to fashion doctrine in other
terms.
The circularity of this "actual expectations" doctrine obscures judi-
cial vision and manifests itself in a logical paradox. Actual expectations
embodied in any contract surely include background state law. Parties
may economize on contract drafting by relying on state law to fill in the
legal gaps. If any contract incorporates the whole body of background
state law, government cannot change any law without infringing some
party's background expectations; state paralysis results. On the other
hand, if a court declares that all agreements are subject to later alteration
at the will of the state legislature, no party to any contract can ever claim
that settled expectations were harmed by a change in state law; state
domination results. Also, the efficiency gained by relying on background
state law dissipates because contracting parties no longer can be sure that
standard gap-filling provisions will be applied in the future. Since the
Allied Structural Steel Court would not allow Minnesota to alter its regu-
lation of pension plans, it could not make such a declaration. The
Court's application of the actual expectations view in Allied Structural
Steel pushed toward state paralysis, consistent with the Court's perfect
markets vision. 175
174. See, ag., 438 U.S. at 247 ("unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts").
175. This dilemma over expectations is escaped by recognizing that the purpose of Con-
tract Clause doctrine is to notify contracting parties of legitimate state law expectations. Con-
ditioning the doctrine on actual expectations creates circular logic; the doctrine becomes
indeterminate. This circularity is unavoidable whenever doctrine is identified with actual ex-
pectations, including expectations based on that doctrine, or with actual behavior, including
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The Energy Reserves Court returned to an unstructured test, avoid-
ing a refined analysis of contractual impairment. Rather than applying
individually the five Blaisdell indicia of public purpose to the state legis-
lation, as was done in Allied Structural Steel, the Energy Reserves Court
announced what it deemed to be the public policy behind the Kansas
Act. It simply reasoned in a conclusory manner that "there can be little
doubt about the legitimate public purpose behind the Act."
176
Conclusion
Even if the trend toward critical use of the Contract Clause begun in
Allied Structural Steel continues, the Supreme Court will not immedi-
ately dismantle the welfare state and require a return to the unregulated
competition of the Lochner era. However, the underlying vision of effec-
tive markets suggested in that case, combined with the view that private
rights have priority over the public interest, leads ultimately to state pa-
ralysis in the face of pressing public concerns.
If Energy Reserves successfully aborts that trend, the severe eco-
nomic recession of the early 1980's deserves part of the credit. Hard
times help dispel any faith that markets work well.177 Whichever view
gains a majority now, the perfect market and private rights vision of Al-
lied Structural Steel or the imperfect market and public interest vision of
Energy Reserves will dominate the constitutional structure of economic
regulation for the next generation, and so determine the agenda of Amer-
ican economic life.
Energy Reserves and Allied Structural Steel represent an ongoing
battle for the mind of a still undecided Supreme Court. The Allied Struc-
behavior modified in light of that doctrine. Cf. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (pro-
cedural due process doctrine based on behavior). To avoid circularity, Contract Clause doc-
trine must define the value protected by contracts independent of any particular agreement.
L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 465, 467 n. 11. In the long run, which is the appropriate horizon for
interpreting a document that aims at shaping society, constitutional clauses must be read to
incorporate fundamental natural rights, as Justice Marshall attempted in his Ogden dissent.
See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 345-46. (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). But cf. Brest, The Fundamen-
tal Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (fundamental rights interpretation of Constitution incapable of
resolving tension between majority rule and minority rights). Within liberal social theory, pro-
tection of personal choice is the right the Contract Clause protects, as that is the value sup-
ported by contract law. See supra note 102. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296,
2305-06 (1983) (private parties cannot be allowed to evade state power over private rights by
making a contract about those rights).
176. 459 U.S. at 417.
177. To the extent that material conditions create a climate that shapes ideas, the economic
emergency of the 1930's led to the Blaisdell decision upholding redistributive economic legisla-
tion. This law almost certainly would have been held unconstitutional in the 19th century.
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tural Steel vision would, if taken to its logical conclusion, return consti-
tutional supervision of economic regulation to a strict scrutiny last seen
in the Lochner era. Yet Energy Reserves casts doubt on whether the
Supreme Court has altered its market vision in the generation since Blais-
dell; to the extent Allied Structural Steel is now seen as an anomoly, the
change in judicial vision is stillborn and the Contract Clause counter-
revolution halted.
